Lateral prefrontal/orbitofrontal cortex has different roles in norm compliance in gain and loss domains: a transcranial direct current stimulation study

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Abstract
Sanction is used by almost all known human societies to enforce fairness norm in resource distribution. Previous studies have consistently shown that the lateral prefrontal cortex (lPFC) and the adjacent orbitofrontal cortex (lOFC) play a causal role in mediating the effect of sanction threat on norm compliance. However, most of these studies were conducted in gain domain in which resources are distributed. Little is known about the mechanisms underlying norm compliance in loss domain in which individual sacrifices are needed. Here we employed a modified version of dictator game (DG) and high-definition transcranial direct current stimulation (HD-tDCS) to investigate to what extent lPFC/lOFC is involved in norm compliance (with and without sanction threat) in both gain- and loss-sharing contexts. Participants allocated a fixed total amount of monetary gain or loss between themselves and an anonymous partner in multiple rounds of the game. A computer program randomly decided whether a given round involved sanction threat for the participants. Results showed that disruption of the right lPFC/lOFC by tDCS increased the voluntary norm compliance in the gain domain, but not in the loss domain; tDCS on lPFC/lOFC had no effect on compliance under sanction threat in either the gain or loss domain. Our findings reveal a context-dependent nature of norm compliance and differential roles of lPFC/lOFC in norm compliance in gain and loss domains.

Introduction
Fairness is the cornerstone of social and political justice across human societies and throughout history (Rawls, 1958; Reeve, 1998). It is about the nature of a socially just allocation of resources in a group or society. Aristotle summarized the principle of fairness as “something equal should be to those who are equal” (Aristotle, cf. Reeve, 1998). As fairness norm is inevitably in conflict with the selfish interest of certain parties in social exchanges, some sorts of sanction are adopted to enforce the fairness norm (Sober & Wilson, 1998; Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Henrich et al., 2006; Montague & Lohrenz, 2007). In other words, whether conforming to fairness norm can be a cost–benefit trade-off or strategic decision in which an individual takes into account the benefit of violating the fairness norm and the cost of being punished (Güth & Damme, 1998).

Mounting evidence has shown that introducing sanction threat for the sake of fairness norm increases norm compliance behavior in resource distribution (Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Spitzer et al., 2007) and that norm compliance under sanction threat has distinct psychological and neural basis compared with voluntary norm compliance, i.e., compliance without sanction threat (Ruff et al., 2013). For example, using a resource allocation task (i.e., the Dictator Game
with and without sanction) and functional MRI, Spitzer et al. (2007) showed that when asked to allocate a certain amount of monetary reward between themselves and an anonymous co-player, the participants allocated more to the co-player (i.e., closer to fairness norm) when a monetary sanction threat was introduced. In parallel with the increased allocation, neural activations in the lateral prefrontal cortex (lPFC) and lateral orbitofrontal cortex (lOFC) were enhanced relative to the sanction-free condition, indicating the involvement of these frontal structures in mediating norm compliance under sanction threat in the gain context. More recently, Ruff et al. (2013) combined such a behavioral task with transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) and demonstrated that modulations of the right lPFC function had opposite effects on voluntary norm compliance and norm compliance under sanction threat (see also Strang et al., 2015).

However, these previous studies only focused on norm compliance in gain domain (hereafter, the term ‘domain’, ‘frame’, and ‘context’ are used interchangeably), leaving aside the situation in which individuals have to share a certain amount of loss or harm. In fact, the latter situations are prevalent in human society, such as sharing compensation for a traffic accident between perpetrators and insurance company. Are people more or less willing to conform to fairness norm in sharing loss than in sharing gain? Is the neural mechanism underlying norm compliance in loss domain the same as that in gain domain? Although to our knowledge no research has directly compared the psychological and neural mechanisms underlying norm compliance in gain and loss domains, a number of studies, including ours, have consistently shown that people are more willing to enforce fairness norm by costly punishment in loss than in gain domain (Buchan et al., 2005; Leliveld et al., 2009; Zhou & Wu, 2011; Guo et al., 2013; Wu et al., 2014). This finding is in line with the general principle in behavioral economics, i.e., potential losses have a greater impact on people’s emotion and decision-making processes than equivalent gains (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, 1991; Tom et al., 2007; Rutledge et al., 2016). Relatedly, Buhl (1999) showed that in inter-group interaction, in-group favoritism is less severe in tasks involving allocating negative resources than in tasks involving allocating positive resources. Taken together, norm compliance is highly context-dependent and the psychological and neural basis underlying norm compliance may vary across contexts, such as the distinction between gain and loss frames and the presence and absence of sanction threat. In this study, we combined a resource distribution task (i.e., Dictator Game, DG) and tDCS to investigate the context-dependent nature of norm compliance. We attempted to answer three interrelated questions. First, does the loss context in general increase norm compliance compared to the gain context, when the lPFC/IOFC function is intact (i.e., in the sham group)? Second, does gain/loss context affect voluntary norm compliance and compliance under sanction threat to a different degree? Third, does the lPFC/IOFC play a causal role in mediating the influence of context on norm compliance? Answering these questions may help understand the context-dependent nature of norm compliance and its neural mechanisms.

Our rationale for focusing on the right lPFC/IOFC is twofold. On the one hand, a number of neuroimaging and neurophysiology studies have consistently implicated the lOFC in representing socially relevant information (e.g., Watson & Platt, 2012) that guides individual’s behavior and decision-making in a socially appropriate manner (Rushworth et al., 2007; Willis et al., 2010). In other words, this area may inform individual about what is socially appropriate behavior in a given context by setting value to the potential behavioral repertoire (Ursu & Carter, 2005). This argument is in line with a number of findings about social conformity and social influence (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010, 2012), which is conceptually related to norm compliance. On the other hand, the lPFC/IOFC is of specific interest to studies of the influence of sanction threat on norm compliance, where conflicting results have been reported (see Spitzer et al., 2007; Li et al., 2009). Our recent study combining fMRI and tDCS has provided a way to reconcile the contradicting evidence by incorporating the intention behind sanction threat (Zhang et al., 2016), suggesting that the lOFC may integrate various social and non-social information to give rise to a compliance decision. For these reasons, we decided to further explore the context-dependent nature of the function of lPFC/IOFC in mediating norm compliance, hereby introducing gain–loss context.

Materials and methods

Participants

Power calculation was carried out to determine sample size. In a previous study that combined tDCS and a similar experimental design (Zhang et al., 2016), we found that the effect size of tDCS on norm compliance was medium to large (i.e., Cohen’s d ranged from 0.4 to 0.5). Based on this knowledge, we estimated the sample size required to obtain a similar effect using G*Power 3 (Faul et al., 2007). The power calculation showed that at least 30 participants were required for each group to achieve the targeted effect size. Sixty-six right-handed participants were recruited. Seven participants were excluded from analysis (three of them always transferred nothing to the partner, and four of them did not believe the experimental setup according to a post-experiment manipulation check and interview), leaving 59 participants in the analysis (tDCS sham group: 17 females and 12 males, mean age 22.3 years, age range 18–25 years; tDCS cathodal group: 23 females and 7 males, mean age 21.5 years, age range 18–25 years). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision; none of them reported a history of neurological or psychiatric disorders. They all gave informed written consent prior to the experiment in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of School of Psychological and Cognitive Sciences, Peking University.

HD-tDCS

High-density stimulation was delivered by a multi-channel stimulation adapter (SoterixMedical, 4 × 1 – C3, New York) connected to a battery-driven stimulator (SoterixMedical, Model 1300-A, New York). Five Ag–AgCl-sintered ring electrodes were put into plastic casings which are filled with conductive gel, embedded in a standard EEG cap according to the international 10–20 system, and attached to the adaptor device. Each electrode had ~4 cm² contact with the skull. The electrodes were arranged on the skull in a 4 × 1 ring configuration based on previous literature (Edwards et al., 2013; Villamar et al., 2013a). The four return electrodes formed a square and were spaced ~7.5 cm radially around the central electrode according to previous HD-tDCS studies (Villamar et al., 2013a,b). To deliver stimulation on the right lPFC/IOFC, we placed three return electrodes on the locations corresponding to F2, F8, Fp1, one return electrode at lower eyelid, and one central electrode on FP2 (Manuel et al., 2014; Mondino et al., 2015; Willis et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2016). Current...
polarity on the target brain area depended on the central electrode. The current distribution under HD-tDCS has been partially validated by empirical data through a MRI-guided finite element model (Datta et al., 2009; Edwards et al., 2013), and recent studies showed that current density of HD-tDCS falls off with increasing cortical depth (Datta et al., 2009). The current intensity was 2.0 mA which created ~0.5 mA/cm² peak current density at the central electrode, and ~0.125 mA/cm² peak current density at the return electrodes. Stimulation started 8 min before the task, and was delivered during the entire course of the task (~20 min) with an additional 30 s ramp-up at the beginning of stimulation and 30 s ramp-down at the end. The placement of electrodes was the same for the sham and the cathodal stimulation. However, for the sham stimulation, the initial 30 s ramp-up was immediately followed by the 30 s ramp-down, and there was no stimulation for the rest of the session (cf. Gandiga et al., 2006; Douglas et al., 2015). For both the cathodal and sham stimulation conditions, participants felt a little uncomfortable initially, but gradually the feelings associated with stimulation became negligible before the task started, according to our post-experiment interview.

Compared with the conventional bipolar tDCS, HD-tDCS has been shown to have better spatial focality and prolonged effect (Datta et al., 2009; Caparelli-Daquer et al., 2012; Kuo et al., 2013; Shen et al., 2016). Although HD-tDCS is associated with stronger scalp sensations than conventional tDCS, it has been shown to be safe and tolerable with applications of up to 2.0 mA for about 20 min (Minhas et al., 2010; Borckardt et al., 2012; Kuo et al., 2013). It should be noted that the spatial resolution of tDCS is limited compared to transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), even in the mode of HD-tDCS (see Fig. 1C for the area estimated to be affected by the tDCS). However, in order to better compare the current findings with the findings from a few previous tDCS studies on similar topics (e.g., Knoch et al., 2008; Ruff et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2016), we use tDCS to manipulate the activity of the IFPC/IOfC.

### Procedure

The experiment had a 2 (stimulation: sham vs. cathodal) by 2 (context: Gain vs. Loss) 2 (threat: threat-on vs. threat-off) mixed factorial design with stimulation as between-subject factor whereas context and threat as within-subject factors. A modified repeated one-shot Dictator Game was employed (cf. Zhang et al., 2016), in which the participants allocated either a profit or a loss of 20 Chinese yuan (about U.S. $3.5) between themselves and a randomly paired co-player randomly chosen from three confederates. In each round, before the participant made the allocation, the computer randomly decided to retain or waive the punishment threat (4 yuan). If the threat was retained and the amount allocated to the paired co-player was lower (higher) than what the latter had expected in the gain (loss) context, the participant would be penalized by 4 yuan, although no feedback was given concerning how much the co-player expected and whether the participants were in fact punished. Voluntary compliance was defined as the amount allocated when no threat was imposed, whereas compliance under sanction threat was defined as the amount allocated when sanction threat was retained. Moreover, threat-induced strategic compliance was defined as the difference in allocation amount between the threat retained and the threat waived conditions.

Upon arrival at the laboratory, the participant and three same-sex strangers (confederates of the experimenter) went through a randomization procedure (i.e., drawing lots) to determine their role in the game. We told the participant that one lot had a letter ‘A’ on it, while the other three had ‘B’. The one who drew the unique lot would be assigned the role of allocator, while the others would be assigned the role of receiver. Unbeknownst to the participant, all the four lots had an “A” on it to ensure that the participant be assigned the role of allocator. The participant believed that he/she would play each round through internet with a randomly paired receiver who was in another room. We told the participant that on each round the paired receiver would indicate the minimum share he/she expected.
from the allocator. If the amount the allocator (i.e., the participant) allocated to the receiver was less than that minimum amount, a sanction may or may not be imposed on the allocator, depending on a prior decision by the computer (see below). To avoid learning effect, no feedback of earning/loss or sanction was provided. The participant was also told that a gain round and a loss round would be randomly chosen and realized after the experiment; this was to motivate the participant to treat each round equally and independently.

Each round began with the presentation of a white fixation cross against a black background, lasting for 4000 to 6000 ms with a step of 400 ms (Fig. 1). Then a cue of the total allocation amount (a picture of 20 yuan bill) was presented for 2000 ms, followed by a sentence indicating that punishment threat would be randomly decided by the computer for this trial. This sentence remained on the screen for 2000–5000 ms (with a step of 400 ms). Then the decision (Waive vs. Retain) together with a picture of computer were presented on the screen for 3000 ms. Specifically, ‘Waive’ means the computer decides that no sanction will be imposed on the current round, so the participant can allocate as she wishes without worrying about sanction. ‘Retain’ means the computer decides to keep the sanction threat on the current trial. In that case, if the participant’s allocation was less than the minimum expectation given by the receiver, the participant would receive a sanction (although he/she did not know whether he/she was actually sanctioned in a given trial). Finally, after a 2000-to-4000-ms fixation, a distribution screen was presented. The participant was required to make the allocation within 10 s by pressing two buttons to adjust the allocation amount with a step of 2 yuan and a third button to confirm the allocation. The allocation was directed to the receiver so that in the gain context the positive points allocated to the receiver would be added to the receiver’s account, while in the loss context, the negative points allocated to the receiver would be deducted from the partner’s account. Button press was counterbalanced across participants. The initial amount on the side of the participant was either 0 or 20 yuan (0 or −20 yuan in the loss context) and was counterbalanced across conditions.

The allocation task consisted of a gain block and a loss block, each of which had 32 trials. Overall the task lasted about 20 min. Block sequence was counterbalanced across participants. A regression analysis showed that the sequence did not have any significant influence on participants’ allocation decision. Therefore, in our data analysis we collapsed this factor. Each of the four experimental conditions (context × threat) has 16 trials. Presentation order of Waive and Retain conditions was pseudo-randomized and different sequences were created for different participants. To make sure that the participants actually believe our experimental setup, we included in the post-experiment questionnaire a number of questions assessing the participants’ thoughts and attitudes about the experiment. These questions are ‘To what extent you care about your payoff in the game’ (1, not at all; 5, very much), ‘To what extent you think you are interacting with a real human partner’ (1, not at all; 5, very much), ‘Do you have any questions, comments, and concerns about this experiment’ (open-ended question). If a participant chose 1 for any of the first two questions or expressed suspicion about the experiment in the third question, we excluded him/her from data analysis.

Participants were randomly assigned to the inhibitory group (i.e., cathodal stimulation) or the control group (i.e., sham stimulation). Before the main task, the participants were familiarized with the task with a practice block of 8 trials. They performed the task while receiving cathodal or sham stimulation. To test whether fairness perception was affected by tDCS, participants indicated, before and after the tDCS stimulation, which of the ten different allocation schemes (from 0 to 20 yuan in steps of 2) to the receiver was fair.

Results
To achieve a similar measure of the degree of compliance in both the gain and the loss domains, we computed the distance between the participant’s allocation and the least compliance situation in each context. Let us suppose that the participant’s allocation in a given trial is x. In the gain context, the degree of compliance, according to our definition, is x−0 = x, which is straightforward. In the loss context, it is x−(−20) = 20+x. For example, if the allocation is −16 for the partner and −4 for the participant, then the degree of compliance to fairness norm is 20+(−16) = 4. Thus, in both the gain and the loss contexts, the lowest level of compliance is 0, which means the participant allocates all the 20 points of gain to him/herself in the gain context or all the 20 points of loss to the partner in the loss context. In the fairest situation, the degree of compliance is 10, both for the gain and the loss contexts. Any amount higher than 10 reflects benevolence of the participant. In the following data analysis, we used this measure as dependent variable.

Loss context influences voluntary compliance and compliance under sanction threat differently
To answer our first and second questions, we carried out a two (context: gain vs. loss) by two (threat: Retain vs. Waive) ANOVA on the degree of compliance only for the sham group. The main effect of context was significant, \( F_{(1,28)} = 5.40, P = 0.028, \) partial \( \eta^2 = 0.16, \) such that the participants in general showed higher norm compliance in loss than in gain domain. Moreover, the context-by-threat interaction was significant, \( F_{(1,28)} = 6.34, P = 0.018, \) partial \( \eta^2 = 0.19. \) Pairwise comparison showed that relative to the gain context, the voluntary norm compliance (i.e., when the sanction threat was waived) in the loss context was significantly higher, \( n(28) = 2.81, P = 0.009 \) (Bonferroni-corrected for multiple comparison). However, no such difference was observed for the norm compliance under sanction threat (i.e., when the sanction threat was retained; Fig. 2A), \( n(28) = 0.93, P > 0.1. \)

IFPC/IOFC is causally involved in norm compliance only in gain domain
To answer our third question, we carried out a two (context: Gain vs. Loss) by two (threat: Retain vs. Waive) by two (treatment: sham vs. cathodal) mixed-design ANOVA on the degree of compliance. The three-way interaction was significant, \( F_{(1,57)} = 6.08, P = 0.017, \) partial \( \eta^2 = 0.10 \) (Fig. 2A). We then carried out two ANOVAs for gain and loss domains separately. For gain domain, the two (treatment: sham vs. cathodal) by two (threat: Retain vs. Waive) interaction was significant, \( F_{(1,57)} = 9.99, P = 0.003, \) partial \( \eta^2 = 0.15. \) Pairwise comparison revealed that relative to the sham group, the cathodal group showed significantly higher voluntary compliance (i.e., when the threat was waived), \( n(57) = 2.03, P = 0.047 \) (Bonferroni-corrected for multiple comparison). The norm compliance under sanction threat was not affected by tDCS condition, \( n(57) = 1.17, P > 0.1. \) For loss domain, the main effect of threat was significant, \( F_{(1,57)} = 12.55, P = 0.001, \) partial \( \eta^2 = 0.18, \) whereas the interaction between threat and treatment was not, \( F_{(1,57)} = 0.12, P > 0.1, \)
indicating that IFPC/IFOC may not play a direct role in mediating norm compliance in the loss-sharing situation.

To view the data from another perspective, we calculated the degree of threat-induced (or strategic) compliance for each domain and each treatment group by subtracting the degree of voluntary compliance from that of the compliance under sanction threat (Retain-Waive; cf. Ruff et al., 2013). This analysis is not independent of the above analysis for the data in Fig. 2A, but it allows us to make cross-study comparison (e.g., Ruff et al., 2013). It is clear from Fig. 2B that disruption of the IFPC/IFOC function reduced the threat-induced compliance in the gain domain, but not in the loss domain. To compare threat-induced compliance between the current study and that in Ruff et al. (2013) (termed “sanction-induced compliance” there), we carried out a two (context: Gain vs. Loss) by two (treatment: sham vs. cathodal) mixed-design ANOVA for threat-induced compliance. The two-way interaction between context and treatment was significant, $F_{1,57} = 6.08, P = 0.017$, partial $\eta^2 = 0.10$. Pairwise comparison showed that in the gain domain, cathodal tDCS significantly reduced threat-induced compliance, $t(57) = 3.16, P = 0.003$ after Bonferroni-correction for multiple comparison, replicating Ruff et al. (2013; see their Fig. 2A). By contrast, the tDCS effect was not significant for the loss domain, $t(57) = 0.34, P > 0.1$. Viewed in an alternative way, the difference in threat-induced compliance between gain and loss domains was significant only in the sham group, $t (28), P = 0.018$, not in the cathodal group, $t(29) = 0.98, P > 0.1$. This indicated that the flexibility in adjusting one’s strategy across contexts relies causally on the function of IFPC/IFOC.

**Fairness perception is not affected by gain-loss context or tDCS condition**

To test whether participants’ perception of fairness norm was affected by gain-loss context and tDCS condition, we carried out a three-way ANOVA with time (before vs. after experiment), context (gain vs. loss), and tDCS treatment (sham vs. cathodal) as independent variable, and the perceived fairness ratings as dependent variable. Due to a technical error, the perceived fairness ratings from 10 participants in the cathodal group and nine participants in the sham group were not available. Nevertheless, we estimated the effects based on the rating data from other 40 participants (20 for the cathodal group, 20 for the sham group). Results revealed neither significant main effects nor interactions, $ps > 0.1$ (Table 1), which was in line with a number of previous brain stimulation studies on fairness and norm compliance (Knoch et al., 2006, 2008; Ruff et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2016). These studies consistently showed that brain stimulation changes decision-making while leaves the knowledge about social norm intact. These results implied that the knowledge of fairness norm is not affected by IFPC/IFOC function or gain–loss context.

**Discussion**

Using HD-tDCS and a modified dictator game, we investigated the context-dependent nature of norm compliance behavior and its neural mechanism. We found that, relative to the gain-sharing context, participants in general conformed more to the fairness norm in the loss-sharing context, especially for voluntary norm compliance. Moreover, disruption of IFPC/IFOC function selectively increased voluntary norm compliance, but not the compliance under sanction threat, in the gain context. In the loss context, neither the voluntary compliance nor the compliance under sanction threat was influenced by IFPC/IFOC function. In other words, these findings showed that disruption of IFPC/IFOC function selectively reduced the strategic compliance in the gain, but not in the loss-sharing context.

How to interpret the higher norm compliance in the loss context? One clue may come from the studies that investigate how gain/loss context influences costly punishment (Leliveld et al., 2009; Zhou & Wu, 2011; Guo et al., 2013; Wu et al., 2014). In these studies, the participant carried out an ultimatum game as a responder, considering whether to accept or reject a monetary division proposed by a co-player (the proposer). If the participant accepts, both get their shares according to the division; if he/she rejects, both get nothing (in the gain context) or lose the entire stake (in the loss context). These studies consistently showed that participants had higher

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**Table 1.** Perceived fairness as a function of context, sanction threat, and tDCS condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
<th>Cathodal Before</th>
<th>Cathodal After</th>
<th>Sham Before</th>
<th>Sham After</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gain</td>
<td>9.2 (1.5)</td>
<td>8.7 (1.0)</td>
<td>9.1 (1.5)</td>
<td>9.0 (1.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss</td>
<td>9.0 (1.0)</td>
<td>9.1 (1.0)</td>
<td>9.8 (1.7)</td>
<td>9.8 (2.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Values in brackets are standard deviations.
rejection rates in the loss context than in the gain context, suggesting that they were more willing to suffer personal cost to punish norm violators in the loss context. Using functional MRI, Wu et al. (2014) further demonstrate that rejecting unfair offers in the loss domain activate the dorsal striatum, an indication of rewarding and satisfactory experience (see also De Quervain et al., 2004; Crockett et al., 2013). It is thus clear from these studies that people have higher demand for fairness in the loss-sharing context. It is possible that in the current study, the participants were (implicitly or explicitly) aware of the higher demand of norm compliance in the loss domain and behaved accordingly.

Alternatively, although allocating less gain and allocating more loss to the co-player equally deviate from fairness norm, these two types of behaviors may induce different feelings, as incurring loss is more easily appraised as a kind of harm and thus is more likely to elicit the feeling of guilt (cf. Van Beest et al., 2005). Harm aversion (or guilt aversion) theory suggests that when making a social/moral decision, people are motivated to minimize the potential harm incurred to other people and the guilt elicited by such harm (Charness & Dufwenberg, 2006; Chang et al., 2011; Crockett et al., 2014; Nihonsugi et al., 2015; Yu et al., 2015). It is possible that in the loss context the participants are more harm/guilt averse and thus more likely to conform to the fairness norm. These two possible psychological mechanisms are not mutually exclusive and future studies are needed to formally distinguish them.

The IOFC is widely held to be critical for behavioral flexibility in social (e.g., Lee, 2008; Nelson & Guyer, 2011) and non-social decision-making (e.g., Ghaehramani et al., 2010; Kehagia et al., 2010). In the gain context, where fairness demand or harm/guilt aversion is not strong enough to dominate decision-making, participants may have more space to adjust their allocation according to specific interactive context (e.g., sanction threat retained vs. waived). Such flexible adjustment seems to be blocked by the disruption of the IOFC function, as the cathodal group made similar allocations in the sanction retained and sanction threat-waived conditions. This interpretation is in line with IOFC’s role in mediating task switch ability and reversal learning, where the agent has to inhibit a familiar behavioral rule and adjust to a new one (Ghaehramani et al., 2010; Kehagia et al., 2010). It is thus conceivable that disruption of IOFC function impairs such ability and the participants cannot adapt their responses to different interactive contexts. The participants generally conformed more to fairness norm in the loss context and showed less flexible adjustment in the loss context, probably because the fairness demand or guilt/harm aversion motivation was high, and thus the space for strategic adjustment is limited.

It is worth comparing the current findings with previous neuroimaging and a brain stimulation studies concerning the effect of sanction threat on norm compliance (Spitzer et al., 2007; Ruff et al., 2013). At first glance, the setup in our study that a computer program randomly decides which round involves sanction threat is similar to the non-social (computer) condition in Ruff et al. (2013) and Spitzer et al. (2007). However, this first impression is misleading. In Ruff et al. (2013) and Spitzer et al. (2007) the computer condition was introduced as a non-social control, where the participants were aware that they did not interact with real human partners and that their allocation decisions did not affect the welfare of any human being. In such context, no social norm prescribes how to share resources with the computer. In contrast, in our study, the computer decided whether sanction threat was present in a given round; the participants believed that they were always interacting with real human partners; their allocation decision thus affected the welfare of another human participant, and they may or may not be punished (randomly determined by computer) if their allocation failed to meet the expectation of that human participant. Therefore, although a computer agent was involved in our study, this should not be mistaken as the non-social control in Ruff et al. (2013) and Spitzer et al. (2007), but instead should be understood as an unintentional social interaction. We deliberately chose the computer (i.e., unintentional) setting in our study to disentangle the effect of intention and the effect of gain–loss frame, as our previous study has demonstrated the modulatory effect of the intention behind sanction threat on norm compliance (Zhang et al., 2016).

Another critical aspect where our setting is similar to the social, rather than the non-social, condition in Ruff et al. (2013) and Spitzer et al. (2007) is that in all of these studies, the participants did not know, at the time of the decision, whether the sanction would actually be implemented. In other words, the participants were only aware of and responded to a threat of sanction, rather than the actual sanction per se. Moreover, whether a given round should involve such a threat of sanction was not determined by the opponent (or partner), even in the human (i.e., social) condition (Spitzer et al., 2007; Ruff et al., 2013), which is similar to the setting in the current study. The allocation in the gain context in our study replicated the pattern reported in Ruff et al. (2013), indicating that the right DLPC–IOFC complex are consistently involved in mediating the effect of sanction threat on norm compliance in gain-sharing context. New to the existing knowledge is our finding that in loss-sharing context, the dependence of the norm compliance under sanction threat on IPFC/IOFC was abolished, suggesting that other psychological processes (e.g., harm/guilt aversion) may play a role loss-sharing context.

It should be acknowledged that having both cathodal and anodal manipulation could further confirm our conclusion concerning the functional role of IPFC/IOFC in norm compliance in different contexts. It may be argued that the effects of cathodal tDCS are less well-characterized than the effects of anodal tDCS. For example, Jacobson et al. (2012) showed that cathodal stimulation produces more variable direction and magnitude of effects from study to study. However, this criticism comes with a qualification: a closer examination of their paper showed that the likelihood to generate Anodal excitation (Ae) effects was significant larger than the likelihood to generate cathodal inhibition (Ci) effects only in language studies; in studies of executive function and decision-making, there was no significant difference between the Ae and Ci effects. In fact, cathodal stimulation has been repeatedly suggested to effectively interrupt the activity of specific brain regions and influence individuals’ social and non-social decision-making (Knoch et al., 2006, 2008; Ruff et al., 2013; Mengarelli et al., 2015; Shen et al., 2016; Maréchal et al., 2017). Specifically, in our previous work on norm compliance (Zhang et al., 2016), we included both types of stimulation and we demonstrated that opposite effects on norm compliance were produced by cathodal and anodal stimulations. Therefore, we believe that both cathodal and anodal stimulations are effective in producing reliable and opposite effects on brain activity and behaviors, at least in the current social decision-making context.

In conclusion, on the basis of previous research, the current study goes one step further in understanding the context-dependent nature of norm compliance behavior and its underlying brain basis. Individuals are more likely to conform to fairness norm and rely less on the existence of external sanction threat in the loss-sharing context than in the gain-sharing context. The right IPFC/IOFC is causally involved in flexibly adjusting compliance behavior to the interactive context (e.g., threat-on vs. threat-off) in the gain context
and such requirement is abolished in the loss context, probably because other motivations (e.g., enhanced fairness demand or harm/guilt aversion) become prominent in loss domain.

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Conflict of interest
The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Author contributions
YY, HY, YZ, and XZ contributed to the design of the study and wrote the paper; YY and ZS collected the data; YY and HY analyzed the data.

Data accessibility
The article’s supporting data can be accessed through the journal’s Figsshare page.

References


